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Abstract. Multi-unit franchising (MUF) is a governance form inside franchising networks 
where the franchisor transfers to the franchisees the right to own and operate more than one 
outlet. While previous empirical literature has revealed various advantages of MUF as 
compared to single-unit franchising (SUF), we study the impact of this governance form on 
the network performance, taking into account different contexts. Our results from propensity 
score matching show that MUF leads to higher performance. However, non-parametric 
estimations highlight thresholds suggesting that a mix of SUF and MUF is a more efficient 
governance form than a pure MUF network.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to study the impact of multi-unit franchising (MUF) on the network 
performance. MUF is a governance mode where the franchisor transfers to the franchisee the 
right to own and operate more than one outlet. Two types of multi-unit franchising are 
distinguished: area development franchising  and sequential multi-unit franchising 
(Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2005). Area development 
franchising is based on a contract that allows a franchisee to run several outlets at a certain 
time in a specified geographical area. It is often associated with a territorial exclusivity right. 
Sequential multi-unit franchising refers to a contract that transfers to the franchisee the right 
to open a new unit in addition to the existing one. 
Previous empirical studies regarding this network form are based on different theoretical 
frameworks, such as resource scarcity theory (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Weaven and Frazer, 
2003; Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2005), dependence theory (Dant and Gundlach, 1998; 
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2002; Dant et al., 2011), transaction costs theory (Kaufmann and 
Kim, 1995; Weaven and Frazer, 2003; Hussain et al., 2013), property rights theory (Hussain 
and Windsperger, 2013), agency theory (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996; Dant and Nasr, 1998; 
Weaven and Frazer, 2003; Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2004; Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2005; 
Garg et al., 2005; Sanchez-Gomez et al., 2010; Gillis et al., 2011; Jindal, 2011), and 
organizational capability theory (Hussain and Windsperger, 2015). 
The empirical literature reveals various advantages of MUF as a network form compared 
to single-unit franchising (SUF). Sequential MUF is considered to be a means to reward high 
quality franchisees and thereby to improve the system efficiency (Sanchez-Gomez et al., 
2010). A complementary argument is that, since existing franchisees are familiar with the 
franchisor's business format and with the local market conditions, MUF reduces the risk of 
failure (Bates, 1998) and enables the franchisor to avoid incurring additional costs for 
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screening, recruiting, and training (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996). In addition, multi-unit 
franchisees usually have higher administrative capabilities than single-unit franchisees 
(Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2005). MUF favors system uniformity (Weaven and Frazer, 
2007), economies of scale for the franchisor and the franchisee (Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 
2002), and a lower level of conflict between the two of them due to the smaller number of 
franchisees that need to be coordinated (Zellner et al., 1980; Weaven and Frazer, 2004). 
Based on these results, it is expected that MUF positively impacts the performance of 
franchise networks. 
Although previous research has highlighted a positive influence of MUF on the system 
performance (e.g. system growth) (Kaufmann and Kim, 1995; Kaufmann and Dant, 1996), 
Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt, 2002), no previous study has provided an explanation and 
empirical tests of the major determinants of the MUF network performance. Starting from this 
gap, the aim of this study is to develop and test hypotheses based on organizational economics 
theories (agency theory, transaction cost theory, and property rights theory) and the relational 
governance view to explain the performance of MUF networks. Overall the results of the 
empirical analysis derived from the German and Swiss franchise data provide some support of 
our research model. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Empirical 
specifications are provided in Section 3. Section 4 contains a first set of estimations. Dealing 
with the impact of MUF on the performance, we address firstly the potential selection and 
endogeneity bias relating to the use of an organizational choice (MUF) as an explanatory 
variable. Section 5 presents our core results, which are based on additive nonparametric 
regressions. We study the effect of MUF on the network performance, distinguishing different 
contexts. Section 6 draws conclusions.  
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2.  Analytical Framework and Hypotheses 
 
In the following, we develop a multi-theoretical framework based on organizational 
economics theories (agency theory, transaction cost theory, and property rights theory) and 
the relational governance view to explain the performance of MUF networks.  
 
2.1   MUF and Relationship Hazards 
Agency theory emphasizes the emergence of opportunistic behavior under asymmetric 
information. In franchising, Rubin (1978) as well as Mathewson and Winter (1985) are 
important starting points of a vast literature on franchising in the framework of agency theory 
(e.g., Brickley, 1999; Mazzeo, 2004; Lafontaine and Oxley, 2004; Gonzalez-Diaz and 
Solis-Rodriguez, 2012; Barthélemy 2008, 2011). In the franchise relationship, opportunistic 
behavior may arise due to asymmetric information in favor of the franchisee regarding his/her 
level of effort (moral hazard) or his/her type (adverse selection). In addition, as the franchise 
network is based on a common brand name and reputation, each franchisee can free ride. 
Thus, agency costs in franchising result from behavioral uncertainty due to free riding on the 
common brand name and the shirking behavior of the network partners. 
MUF offers a solution to this relationship hazards. Under MUF, the agency problem is 
transferred to the downstream level by establishing mini-chains in which the franchisees are 
in charge of the outlet managers. Studying the factors that influence the choice of the 
organizational form when franchisors add new franchised units to their networks, 
Sanchez-Gomez et al. (2010) provide evidence from the Spanish franchise sector that MUF 
mitigates free riding and adverse selection problems. In addition, based on longitudinal North 
American data, Jindal (2011) shows that by reducing the size of the internal hierarchy, MUF 
reduces moral hazard problems. Gillis et al. (2011) obtain similar results on US data regarding 
restaurant franchisors. They show that faster-growing franchisors use MUF as a reward in a 
tournament to reduce agency problems. From this agency-theoretical perspective we can 
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derive the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
Brand name value is positively associated with the performance of MUF networks. 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Behavioral uncertainty due to shirking is positively associated with the performance of MUF 
networks. 
 
 
2.2  MUF and Environmental Hazards 
According to the transaction cost theory, environmental uncertainty influences the choice of 
inter-organizational governance mechanism (Williamson, 1975, 1991).  In the case of 
franchising, environmental uncertainty reflects the difficulty faced by the franchisor in 
predicting the development of the local market due to economic hazards (e.g., demand and 
competition) and institutional changes. Williamson (1991) and Gibbons (2005) show that a 
high level of environmental uncertainty requires the firm to be more adaptable by delegating 
some coordination tasks to local entrepreneurs. Applied to franchising, this reasoning justifies 
the use of more SUF assuming that single-unit franchisees have a stronger entrepreneurial 
orientation compared to the outlet managers in a mini-chain and react more quickly to the 
changes in local markets (Sorenson and Sorensen, 2001). Therefore, with a high level of 
environmental uncertainty, SUF would provide performance advantages compared to MUF 
due to the single-unit franchisees' higher level of entrepreneurial capabilities and incentives to 
exploit the local market opportunities (Garg et al., 2005). We formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3 
Environmental uncertainty is negatively associated with the performance of MUF networks. 
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2.3  MUF and Intangible System-specific Assets 
According to the property rights reasoning (Hart 1995), intangible system-specific assets 
influence the structure of ownership rights in franchising network (e.g., Windsperger, 2004a; 
Windsperger and Dant, 2006). Franchisor’s system-specific assets includes his/her business 
know-how, skills in site selection, product development, marketing advertising, purchasing 
and merchandizing. When the system-specific assets are characterized by a high degree of 
intangibility, they generate a high residual income stream. In this case, franchisors will 
exersise more control over their use at the local market (Hussain and Windsperger 2013) by 
setting up MUF agreements. MUF enables the franchisors to apply more standardized 
operational routines and procedures, resulting in performance advantages. Hence, we 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4 
Intangible system-specific assets are positively associated with the performance of MUF 
networks. 
 
 
2.4  MUF and Trust 
In recent years, several studies have investigated the role of trust in franchising (e.g., Cochet 
et al., 2008 ; Dickey et al., 2008; Croonen, 2008; Dant et al., 2011; Davies et al., 2011 ; 
Gorovaia and Windsperger, 2013; Mumdziev and Windsperger, 2013). According to the 
relational governance view (e.g., Macneil 1983; Heide and John 1992; Zajac and Olsen, 1993; 
Dyer and Singh 1998;  Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Gulati and Nickerson, 2008), trust is an 
important informal governance variable that may mitigate the problem of contractual 
incompleteness due to uncertainty and intangibility. In a recent study, Griessmair et al. (2014) 
highlight the impact of trust on the franchisor's organizational choice regarding MUF. 
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Applying the relational governance reasoning, we expect that a high level of trust between the 
franchisor and the franchisees will improve the performance of MUF networks by reducing 
transaction costs, due to lower relational risk, and increasing transaction value, due to more 
information sharing. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5 
Trust is positively associated with the performance of MUF networks. 
 
 
2.5 MUF and Decision Rights 
 
Already Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that the decision structure of a firm consists of two 
interrelated parts: decision managment rights and decision control rights.  Applied to 
franchising networks, under MUF the franchisor transfers a higher fraction of decision 
management rights to the local franchisees than under SUF. Specifically, the multi-unit 
franchisees have more decision making power regarding monitoring, local human resource 
management and knowledge transfer betweeen the headquarters and the local outlets 
(Windsperger, 2013). Consequently, we expect that complementarity between MUF and the 
delegation of decision rights to multi-unit franchisees will increase the performance of MUF 
networks. Hence, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 
Delegation of decision rights is positively associated with the performance of MUF networks.  
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Overall, we can conclude that brand name, behavioral uncertainty, environmental 
uncertainty, system-specific knowhow, trust and decision rights influence the performance of 
MUF networks: Figure 1 provides an overview of the research model. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
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3.    Data and measurement 
 
3.1  Data collection 
We use German and Swiss data to test the research model on performance of MUF networks 
(see figure 1). The directories of the German and Swiss franchise associations and "Franchise 
Wirtschaft" (a Bond's Franchise Guide type directory of all franchise systems in Austria, 
Germany, and Switzerland) list all franchise systems operating in these countries. Various 
demographic data (i.e., the year the system was established, the number of outlets, the 
business sector, etc.) are also listed regarding each system in the Franchise Wirtschaft. 
Judgmental sampling was employed and the sample regroups franchised networks with at 
least five outlets. The final sample consists of 491 German and 176 Swiss franchise systems. 
The data were collected via self-administered questionnaires developed in several steps. 
After several preliminary refinements, in-depth interviews were conducted with franchise 
professionals from the Austrian and German franchise associations and a pre-test was 
conducted with 20 franchisors in Austria. The respondents are selected based on their 
expertise and relevance to the subject under investigation. This demonstrates the use of the 
key informant (McKendall and Wagner III, 1997) approach for data collection. Accordingly, 
the key informants for this study were senior managers who are mainly responsible for the 
expansion of their franchises. The information about the key informants was retrieved from 
the Franchise Wirtschaft. The questionnaires were mailed to the key informants of all of the 
491 relevant franchise systems in Germany and 176 in Switzerland. A total number of 166 
questionnaires were completed. The response rate is 27.9% for Germany and 17.05% for 
Switzerland. 
Two methods were used to check for non-response bias. First, the non-response bias was 
estimated by comparing early versus late respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977), where 
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late respondents serve as proxies for non-respondents. Second, the respondents were 
compared to non-respondents in terms of age, size, advertising fee, and royalties to determine 
whether non-response was a serious problem for the data. These variables are available in the 
‘Franchise Wirtschaft’ for the listed systems. These data were used to run independent sample 
t-tests in order to check whether the sample is representative. The results show that there is no 
significant difference between the respondents and the non-respondents. In addition, on the 
basis of Podsakoff et al. (2003), the Harman's single factor test was used to examine whether 
a significant amount of common method variance exists. After conducting factor analysis, it 
was possible to feel confident that common method bias is not a serious problem in this study. 
 
3.2     Measurement 
 
 
3.2.1  Dependent variable. The dependent variable is the performance of the 
franchising network evaluated by the franchisor. We used subjective measures of franchisor 
performance. According to previous studies (e.g. Dess and Robinson, 1984; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1998), subjective performance measures are highly correlated with objective 
performance measures. The franchisors were asked to rate their network performance on a 
seven-point Likert scale. Thus, the performance is measured as the sum of the following 
items: Savings in administrative costs, system growth, better alignment of products and 
services to the customer need, more effective coordination between the head office and 
outlets, reduction in costs, increase in yields, increase in innovation, savings in coordination 
and control costs, better quality of offered products, profit growth (Cronbach alpha  = 
0.849).  
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3.2.2   Independent  variables. MUF: Two measures of MUF are successively 
used. First, a dummy variable indicating the presence of MUF in the network, then, a 
quantitative variable expressing the percentage of MUF (ratio between the number of 
franchised units divided by the numer of franchisees). A similar ratio has been used in 
previous studies as an indicator for MUF (Gomez et al., 2010; Griessmair et al., 2014). .  
Brand name (Free-riding risk): Based on the works of Combs et al. (2004) and 
Barthélemy (2008), the brand name is measured on a seven-point Likert scale. The 
franchisors were asked to rate their network on brand name strength compared with 
competitors, brand recognition compared with competitors, reputation for quality, and the 
importance of the brand name for achieving competitive advantage ( = 0.803). 
Environmental uncertainty: Based on Celly and Frazier (1996) and John and Weitz 
(1989), the franchisors were asked to rate fluctuations in outlet sales, the changes of the 
market environment, and the difficulty to predict the development at the local market on a 
seven-point Likert scale ( = 0.845). 
Behavioural uncertainty: Adapted from Anderson (1985) and Mumdziev and 
Windsperger (2013), the franchisors were asked to rate the difficulty of measuring the outlet 
performance (the franchisee or manager), controlling their behavior, and assessing their 
competencies and capabilities on a seven-point Likert scale ( = 0.768). 
System-specific knowhow: Consistent with Erramilli et al. (2002), this variable measures 
the difficulties of transferring the system knowledge from the franchisor to the franchisees. 
The franchisors were asked to rate the transfer of brand name, marketing knowhow, 
organizational knowhow, quality management, accounting, human resources know-how to 
franchisees on a seven-point Likert scale ( = 0.915). 
Trust: In line with the works of Anderson and Narus (1990) and Dyer and Chu (2000), 
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the franchisors were asked to rate the level of trust between themselves and their franchisees, 
the atmosphere of openness and sincerity, and the degree of mutual cooperation ( = 0.803) . 
Decision rights: The decision rights index (as formative construct) is based on 
Windsperger (2004b) and Mumdziev and Windsperger (2011). The franchisors were asked to 
rate the franchisee's influence on operational decisions in the franchising network regarding 
procurement, price and product/service, advertising, human resources (recruitment and 
training), investment and finance, outlet equipment, introduction of new products, and the 
application of accounting systems on a seven-point Likert scale. 
 
 
3.2.3  Control  variables  
Size is measured as the total number of company-owned and franchised outlets in the 
network. 
Age is measured by the number of years since the first franchise outlet was established. 
Advertising rate are measured as the percentage of the franchised unit's sales. 
Advantages of franchising: The franchisors were asked to rate the advantages of 
franchising compared to company-owned outlets in respect of quality control, innovation, 
local market knowledge, administrative skills, and human resource management on a 
seven-point Likert scale ( = 0.788). 
Franchisor's transaction-specific investments: The franchisors were asked to rate their 
initial investment with regard to their expenses for their franchisees' training at the beginning 
of the contract, and their expenses for the provision of technical support to the franchisee at 
the beginning of the relationship on a seven-point Likert scale ( = 0.722) 
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3.2  Summary statistics and correlations 
 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviation and correlations between the dependent, 
independent and control variables. Because the presence of a few missing values may bias the 
estimations1, we choose to impute them using the multiple imputation method2. Descriptive 
statistics regarding the variable MUF show that 106 of the sample networks (versus 60) use 
this organizational form. ANOVA analysis underlines the relevance of examining the link 
between MUF and the network performance. The analysis highlights the statistically 
significant difference in the mean performance of the two types of organizational forms; that 
is, MUF networks compared to SUF networks (F = 12.652,  p - value = 0). 
                                                          
1 The missing values vary between 0.6% and 15.6%. The lower bound relates to several components of the 
brand name, trust, and performance variables; the upper bound relates to components of the decision rights 
variable. 
2 The statistical theory suggests that using the method of averages to complete the missing data introduces bias 
in the value of the estimator and its variance. Rubin (1996) proposes multiple imputation as a solution. This 
method uses Monte Carlo simulations to replace the missing data from a number (m > 1) of simulations. In each 
simulation, the complete data matrix is analysed using conventional statistical methods. Finally, the method 
combines the results to generate robust estimators. Thus, the multiple imputation method replaces missing values 
at random, and does not generate bias in the allocation of imputed values. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
  
               1. Performance 35,5177 7,36157 1 
   
 
            
2. MUF(\%) ,4765 ,92669 ,311** 1            
    
 
           
3. Environmental 
  uncertainty 
7,6329 3,32415 -,228** -,270** 1           
    
 
          
4. Decision rights  
 
58,8609 14,22159 ,446** ,205** ,012 1          
     
 
         
5. System 
   know-how 
29,1220 10,47697 ,402** ,261** -,011 ,226** 1         
      
 
        
6. Brand name 22,5663 4,41263 ,376** ,187* -,055 ,188* ,112 1        
 
       
 
       
7. Trust 13,3734 4,01929 -,024 -,079 ,157* ,015 -,286** ,080 1       
         
 
      
8. Behavioral  
  uncertainty 
6,5489 2,89779 ,283** ,268** -,011 ,251** ,371** ,157* -,235** 1      
         
 
     
9. Advertising rate 1,1584 3,57935 ,051 ,033 -,064 -,070 -,083 ,176* -,063 ,001 1     
          
 
    
10. Franchisor 
investment 
13,0602 3,88735 ,198* ,143 -,013 ,007 ,211** ,159* ,057 -,064 ,092 1    
           
 
   
11. Network age 11,3081 7,97799 ,123 ,196* ,015 ,026 ,103 ,106 -,033 ,162* ,030 -,052 1   
             
 
  
12. Size 137,1080 282,98744 ,069 ,085 ,001 ,164* -,021 -,144 ,033 ,059 -,020 -,119 ,390** 1  
              
 
 
13. Franchise  
   advantage 
17,7496 6,11307 -,079 -,172* ,145 ,015 ,108 -,032 ,266** ,027 -,135 ,041 -,088 -,023 1 
               
 
Note: * Signifiant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.
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4.  Control for potential selection bias 
 
4.1  Methodology 
4.1.1 Heckman method. The choice to use MUF as an organizational form is a 
strategic decision of the franchisor. For this reason, studying MUF as an explanatory variable 
of performance raises a potential problem of endogeneity and selection bias. Because the 
decision is not made randomly, the results can be biased and inconsistent. These problems 
regarding the impact of strategic decisions in terms of performance have previously been 
emphasized by Masten (1996), Hamilton and Nickerson (2003), Saussier and Yvrande-Billon 
(2004) and Chaudey and Fadairo (2010). We use the two-step Heckman method (Heckman, 
1979) to handle this problem. It consists of first estimating a probit selection equation for the 
governance choice; here, the presence of MUF. This stage is used to calculate the 
non-selection hazard; that is, the inverse of Mills' ratio. In a second step, the regression 
equation for the performance includes the non-selection hazard as an additional parameter. 
The significance of the inverse of Mills' ratio highlights the presence of a selection bias. 
We use the following probit model as the first step to estimate the probability that a 
network chooses MUF; that is, the self-selection decision. Consistent with the literature 
assessing why franchisors choose MUF versus SUF, the model is specified as follows: 
 
              Pr (Mi = 1) = α0  + α1 ti + α2 ei + α3 li + α4 f ri + α5 ski                   (1) 
                          +α6 bi  + α7 di + α8 ai + α9 +si + εi 
where: 
i = f ranchisor 
Mi = dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if there is at least one multi-unit 
franchise in the network and 0 otherwise 
ti = level of trust of the franchisor in the franchisee 
ski = system know-how 
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ei = environmental uncertainty 
si = size of the franchised network 
fri = behavioral uncertainty 
di = decision rights 
bi = brand name value 
li = advantages of franchising 
ai = age 
εi = error term 
 
An endogenity problem may arise in this equation regarding the decision rights variable. 
Indeed, unobservable characteristics may simultaneously affect this variable and the outcome 
variable. There is no good instrument in the data for the decision rights variable3. For this 
reason, the instrumental variables method, or the test of exogeneity for a probit (tobit) model 
developed by Smith and Blundell (1986), cannot be performed. 
To deal with this problem, the Heckman model is estimated once with the decision rights 
variable and once without this variable. As the estimation results are qualitatively similar, we 
conclude that the variable is not endogenous. The inverse of the Mills ratio  (λ), which 
captures the magnitude of the selection bias, is obtained from equation (1). In the second step 
of the Heckman method, that is, the equation for the performance (Pi), the parameter λ is 
enclosed as an additional regressor. This second equation includes all the explanatory 
variables of the probit equation, less the variable advantages of franchising4. 
 
                                                          
3 A good instrument satisfies two conditions: it has an explanatory power with respect to the suspected 
endogenous variable, and it does not influence directly the outcome variable. 
4 The Heckman method requires the inclusion in the first equation of at least one explanatory variable affecting 
the strategic choice (here MUF) but not directly the performance. In the estimations, the variable advantages of 
franchising  (li) are used in this way. 
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Pi = λ + β0 + β1 ei + β2 ti + β3 f ri + β4 ski                   (2) 
                           + β5 bi  + β6 di + β7 ai + β8 si + εi 
 
If the inverse of the Mills ratio (λ) is not significant, the self-selection decision variable, 
here MUF (Mi), can be introduced in the equation for the performance with no risk of 
selection bias. Regarding this last stage, that is, the OLS estimates for the network 
performance based on MUF, we control for heterocedasticity with the Breusch-Pagan test and 
for multicolinearity with the variance inflation factor (VIF). In addition, we control for the 
potential endogeneity. As good instrumental variables are not available due to the cross 
sectional and mainly qualitative data, we use a version of the Hausman specification test5. 
Finally, we check for the normality of the residues with the Skewness and Kurtosis tests. 
 
4.1.2 Propensity score matching (PSM). As a complement to the Heckman 
method, PSM enables us to control whether the decision to use MUF provides the expected 
effects and whether these effects are attributable to the presence of this organizational form. In 
other words, PSM enables us to study what would have happened if the franchisor had not 
decided to use MUF. The method requires us to select a group of franchisors not using MUF 
(the control group) that are comparable to the group of franchisors using MUF (the treatment 
group). This selection is based on observable characteristics. The literature shows that PSM 
reduces the bias in the estimation of treatment effects when traditional regression methods are 
often unreliable because of the nonrandom assignment of individuals to the treatment and 
                                                          
5 Using the reduced form {𝑌1 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖
𝑌2 = 𝜋0 + 𝜋1𝑋𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖
 as an example, the procedure can be described as follows: first we 
get the residue vi from the regression of Y1 with the exogenous variables (in the reduced form), then we regress Y2 
as a function of  Y1 and vi. If the coefficient of vi is significant, it is then not possible to reject the hypothesis of 
simultaneity. 
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control groups. Thus, the estimation of the treatment effect can be biased by the existence of 
confounding factors. In this study, the confounding factors can be viewed as unobserved 
factors that may affect both the franchisor's performance and the franchisor's propensity to use 
MUF as a governance form (e.g., intrinsic managerial abilities and unobservable changes in 
the franchisor's operating environment). PSM corrects the estimations of the treatment effects 
by controlling for the existence of these confounding factors. 
The method is based on the idea that the bias is reduced when there is a comparison of the 
outcomes using treated and control individuals (i.e., MUF and not MUF) who are as similar as 
possible. PSM was first introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) on the propensity score 
in which the conditional probability of receiving treatment given tr, denoted p(tr) as a 
matching measure. According to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), when the data justify the 
matching on tr, the matching based on the propensity score is also justified. The aim here is to 
estimate the average effect of the treatment group on the treated group (Att). 
 
Att ≡ EY1i |Di = 1 – EY0i | Di = 1               (3) 
 
where, Y1i is the performance of the networki when the franchisor is using MUF and Y0i when 
it is otherwise and D = 1; 0 is the indicator of exposure to the treatment (1=MUF, 0 did not 
use MUF). EY1i |Di = 1 and EY0i |Di = 0 are observable whereas EY0i |Di = 1 and EY1i |Di = 0 
are not. They are called unobserved counterfactuals. 
 
 
The following matching methods are relevant to estimate Att: 
- Nearest neighbor: this method enables us the matching of each individual in the treatment 
group with the individual in the control group that has the closest propensity score. The 
problem could be that the distance between propensity scores can be very large. Following 
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Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 899), a matching set can be defined as: 
 
Ai (p(tr)) = pj |minj || pi – pj ||         (4) 
 
- Radius matching: unlike the previous method, it defines a neighborhood bounded by a radius 
that limits the differences that should be in the propensity scores for the matching. 
- Kernet matching: the individuals in the treatment sample are compared to a the weighted 
average of the individuals in the control sample. The weights are inversely proportional to the 
distance between the propensity scores of the treatment and of the control group. 
- Stratification matching: this method separates the propensity scores into categories 
(quartile). For each quartile, the method allows to match the treatment and the control 
individuals. 
 
4.2  Results 
4.2.1 Results from the Heckman method. The first set of estimates resulting from the 
Heckman method are presented in Table 2. These results highlight that the inverse of Mills' 
ratio (λ) is not significant (model 2). In others words, there is no problem of selection bias. 
Therefore, we introduce the variable MUF (Mi) in the last stage of the estimations (model 3) 
as the core explanatory variable for the network performance, with the other independent 
variables (Age, Size, Franchisor's investment, Advertising rate) being used as control 
variables. We use the White's correction for the standard errors (Breusch-Pagan χ2: 4.91, 
pvalue: 0.0268). In this equation (model 3) we do not find any severe multicolinearity (VIF: 
1.12) or endogeneity problems. 
Our estimations of model 3 show that the influence of MUF (Mi) on performance is 
significant and positive. In other words, this governance form impacts significantly and 
positively the network performance.  
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For robustness checks, and because of the non-normality of the residues, highlighted by 
the Skewness and Kurtosis tests, we perfrom a Huber and Tukey biweights regression (model 
4) and a quantile regression (model 5). These estimation methods address the problem of 
non-normality of the residues6. Our estimation results show that the significantly positive 
influence of MUF on the network performance is robust. 
Table 2 
Control for selection bias and ﬁrst set of results 
  Heckman Method OLS 
 
OLS 
Huber and 
Tukey 
 
Quantile  
regression 
  
First stage  
(Probit) 
Second stage 
(OLS) 
 
  Mi (1) Pi (2) Pi (3) 
 
Pi (4) 
 
   Pi (5) 
            
Environmental  
uncertainty 
-0.0942*** 
(0.0346) 
-0.720** 
(0.293) 
  
    
      
Decision   
rights  
 
-0.0131   
(0.00830) 
     0.147** 
(0.0621) 
  
    
    
System 
know-how 
0.0215 
(0.0127) 
0.297*** 
(0.0781) 
  
    
      
Brand name 0.027 
(0.0265) 
0.528*** 
(0.182) 
  
    
        
Behavioral  
uncertainty 
 
Trust 
0.0542 
(0.0445) 
 
-0.0134 
(0.0311) 
0.128 
(0.268) 
 
0.0465 
(0.175) 
  
    
 
Network  
age 
 
0.018 
(0.0158) 
 
0.024 
(0.117) 
 
0.073 
(0.0712) 
0.04609 
(0 .0689) 
0.1277 
(0.12708) 
 
 
 
Size 
  
 
 
 
0.00377*** 
(0.00123) 
 
 
 
0.00368 
(0.00325) 
 
 
 
0.000499 
(0.00121) 
0.00059 
(0.00194) 
-0.001 
(0.0035) 
MUF 
(dummy) 
     
2.814** 
(1.191) 
2.185** 
(1.085) 
3.713* 
(2.000)     
            
                                                          
6 The first method reduces the influence of outliers in the estimation. It consists of applying a regression in which 
weights based on absolute residuals are obtained. A new regression is then performed using these weights 
(Hamilton, 1991). Quantile regression (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) minimizes the sum of the absolute deviations 
from the median (θ = 0.5). This method is robust to non-normal errors and outliers. 
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Franchisor's 
investment 
     
0.358** 
(0.168) 
 
0,01548 0,3843 
(0 .24019)     (0.1302) 
Advertising 
rate 
     
0,0448 
(0.0625) 
 
0,0771 -0,0995 
(0.2582)     (0.1400) 
Franchise  
advantage 
0,0181 
(0.0202) 
        
    
 
  
 
Constant 
 
 
-0,38 
(0.844) 
 
 
6,704 
(5.880) 
 
 
28.09*** 
(2.297) 
31,239 
(1.9532) 
31.517*** 
( 3.6023)   
            
Inverse of 
Mills ratio 
  6,472 
(4.623) 
  
    
Lambda  (λ)         
 
N 
 
166 
 
166 
 
166 166 166 
 
pseudo R2, R2     
    
   0,0905              0,0415    
 
χ2, F   
 
38.11*** 
 
4.53*** 
 
1.72** 
 Note: Significant  *at the 10% level,  **at the 5% level, ***at the 1% level.                              
Standard errors are in brackets. 
  
  
  
4.2.2 Results from PSM. To carry out the estimation of p(tr), we study the role played 
by several franchisor's characteristics on the probability of introducing MUF as the 
governance structure. The treated networks are those using MUF as the governance form, 
whereas the controls are the networks that do not use MUF at all. That is why we perform a 
probit regression with the dummy variable MUF as the dependent variable. 
As independent variables, we use the same independent variables as in the Heckman 
specification. These independent variables define characteristics of the franchisors using 
MUF. The estimation results of PSM are the same as the probit estimations (1) in Table 2. 
The balancing property condition is satisfied after the partition of the sample into six 
homogeneous blocks, according to their estimated propensity score value. Table 3 reports the 
results of Att, which were calculated by using the following matching methods: nearest 
neighbor, radius, kernet and stratification. As highlighted by Table 3, the PSM results confirm 
the Heckman results, providing evidence that franchising networks using MUF have higher 
performance than the networks that do not use it as a governance form. 
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This key result calls for us to go further, and to take into account the percentage of MUF 
in the franchised network instead of the dummy variable (Mi), as well as the different contexts 
distinguished by the testable predictions (Hypotheses 1-6). Regarding this last point, a 
nonparametric analysis is required and a reasoning in three dimensions to study the influence 
of MUF (1), on the network performance (2), in a specific context (3): business-format, level 
of behavioral uncertainty, decentralization level of decision rights, level of trust in the 
franchise relationship, level of environmental uncertainty. We deal with these issues in the 
following section. 
Table 3 
Results of PSM estimations 
 
Treated   Control  ATT 
Nearest neighbor 
matching      106     35 3.675*** 
(1.231)       
Radius matching     106     56 3.122*** 
(0.428)       
Kernet matching     106     56 3.065*** 
(1.917)       
Stratification matching     105     57 3.148*** 
(1.176)       
Note: Significant  *at the 10% level,  **at the 5% level, ***at the 1% level. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Impact of Multi-unit franchising on the network 
performance 
 
5.1  Estimations 
5.1.1Methodology. The additive regression analysis enables a reasoning in three 
dimensions, as required by the hypotheses. In addition, it is a nonparametric method, which 
overcomes the problem of non-normality affecting the data. The nonparametric regression 
analysis is designed to avoid any specific assumption about the residues, which allows a better 
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distribution of the parameters. In other words, this method relaxes the assumption of linearity. 
The only restriction imposed is that the function g(.) is smooth. For this reason, such type of 
methods are also called smoothing methods. 
Among the nonparametric methods, additive regression specifies the mean of the 
response variable as the sum of the smooth functions of the regressors. When the response 
variable does not follow a normal distribution, the method can be generalized, as proposed by 
Hastie and Tibshirani (1986). The generalized additive model is a generalized linear model, 
which implies a sum of smooth functions of covariates7. 
 
Our model can be written as follows: 
Pi = g1 (ei) + g2 (ti) + g3 (f ri) + g4 (ski ) + g5 (bi) + g6 (di) + εi         (5) 
The simple regression smoother is used to fit the partial regression function gj(.). 
 
5.1.2  Results. Table 4 presents the estimation results of six additive models (8-13) 
regarding the influence of MUF expressed as a percentage, on the performance, taking into 
account six contextual variables: brand name value, system know-how, level of behavioral 
uncertainty, delegation level of decision rights, level of trust in the franchise relationship, 
and level of environmental uncertainty. In addition, for robustness checks, we report the 
estimation results of a Huber and Tukey regression (model 6) and of a quantile regression 
(model 7), including all the explanatory variables8. The good global significance of these 
                                                          
7 For more detailed information, see Wood (2006). 
8 OLS estimates with all the explanatory variables do not present any problem of endogeneity, heterogeneity, or 
multicolinearity (Breusch-Pagan χ2: 0.44, pvalue: 0.5048; VIF: 1.20). However, as in the preceding case of 
model (3), the normality tests (Skewness and Kurtosis) highlight the non-normality of the residues (χ2:14.36, 
pvalue: 0.0008). For this reason, this estimation method is not appropriate here. 
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models is highlighted by R2 (additive models) and Pseudo R2 (quantile regression), which 
are quite high for cross-sectional data (between 21.58% and 37%), and by the χ2 test (Huber 
and Tukey regression). 
Furthermore, regarding the additive models, we perform an analysis of deviance by 
means of χ2 tests for linearity that compares each additive model with its linear version. Such 
tests for linearity show that, in all the cases, the difference is highly statistically significant, 
which means that the additive nonparametric regressions provide a more accurate estimate of 
the relationship between the performance and the independent variables. Complementary 
results are provided by additive models including interactive terms; that is, for each model, 
the interaction of MUF (expressed as a percentage) with a contextual variable (models 14-19, 
Table 5). Here again, the high level of the R2 (between 28.6% and 39.5%) underlines the good 
global significance of the estimations. 
 
The results are robust and clearly emphasize the significant positive impact of MUF on 
the network performance. The two models including all the study variables (models 6 and 7) 
highlight the relevance of the theoretical framework. Indeed, except for trust, and behavioral 
uncertainty in model (7), all of the explanatory variables exert a significant influence on the 
MUF network performance. The signs of the impact on performance are coherent, and 
indicate a negative impact of environmental uncertainty, a positive impact of the delegation of 
decision rights, a positive impact of the system know-how, and a positive impact of the brand 
name. These results are confirmed by additive nonparametric regressions (8) to (13), except 
for the variable environmental uncertainty. In the additive models, trust and behavioral 
uncertainty have a significant effect. 
The estimations are completed with models enclosing interactive terms. As suggested by 
the hypotheses, the interaction of MUF with the contextual variables derived from the 
analytical framework has a significant effect on the network performance in all of the cases. 
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Estimates based on the tensor product method are presented in Table 5 (models 14 to 19). For 
robustness checks, we perform, additional estimations using a variant of the tensor product 
method in Table 6. Here again, the impact of the interactive terms on the performance is 
highly significant. 
Parametric methods estimate the slope of linear relationships between independent and 
dependent variables, this slope is supposed to be the same whatever the level of the 
independent variable. Nonparametric estimations provide more complex information. Thus, 
regarding the additive nonparametric estimations (models 8 to 13), Table 4 reports four pieces 
of information for each independent variable (e.g., the MUF% in model 8). First, the 
smoothing term of the partial-regression function (e.g., 7.289). Second, the result of the 
Fisher's test regarding this smoothing term, which indicates whether the effect of the 
independent variable on the performance is significant (e.g., 4.711***). Third, the type of 
relationship between the independent variable and the performance, that is, decreasing (DR) 
or increasing (IR). Finally, the point (i.e., the level of the independent variable) from which 
the influence does not significantly differ from zero; for example, IR: 0.25 regarding MUF in 
model (8). 
As MUF is expressed as a percentage, this specific result means that the higher the 
percentage of MUF in the network, the higher the performance (IR), as long as the percentage 
of MUF in the network is below 25%. Similar thresholds are highlighted by the other 
estimation results: 20.5% in model (9), 55% in model (11), 8.9% in model (12), 66.7% in 
model (13)9. This is a key result of the nonparametric estimations, suggesting that MUF 
improves the network performance, but only up to a certain threshold. In others words, some 
mix between MUF and SUF is required, with the mix level depending on the context: 
delegation level of decision rights (model 9), brand name value (model 11), level of trust 
                                                          
9 The effect of MUF in model (10) is not significant, as highlighted by the Fisher's test. 
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(model 12), and behavioral uncertainty (model 13). The point from which the effect of the 
explanatory variable is null is derived from the graphs regarding the partial-regression 
functions (see Figure 2). The points in each graph of Figure 2 are partial residuals for the 
corresponding predictor, removing the effect of the other predictor. Graphical analysis is 
continued and developed hereafter with the three-dimensional perspective plots.  
 
5.2  Graphical analysis 
The fitted surfaces for the additive nonparametric regressions are presented in Figure 3. 
Perspective plots are predictions of the nonparametric models based on the data. Each graph 
represents the impact of MUF (%), in addition with a contextual variable, on the network 
performance. In accordance with the research model, six contextual variables are successively 
taken into account: brand name (a), behavioral uncertainty (b), environmental uncertainty (c), 
system know-how (d), trust (e), decision rights (f). As previously mentioned, nonparametric 
regression analysis relaxes the assumption of linearity, substituting the much weaker 
assumption of a smooth population regression function. Although the gain is a more accurate 
estimate of the regression function, relaxing the assumption of linearity has a cost in the 
difficulty of understanding the results. A considerable advantage of the additive regression 
model is that it reduces to a series of two-dimensional partial-regression problems, which 
facilitates the interpretation. Thus, for each three-dimensional perspective plot of the fitted 
additive regression surface relating the performance to MUF and to a contextual variable, the 
slices of the surface in the direction of MUF (i.e., holding the contextual variable constant at 
various values) are all parallel. Similarly, the slices in the direction of the contextual variable 
(holding MUF constant) are parallel, which allows for interpretation. All of the perspective 
plots highlight a relationship for both MUF and each contextual variable with performance. 
This result provides important support to the analytical framework. In addition, this 
relationship is not linear, because each perspective plot consists of a set of curves versus lines. 
  
Table 4 
Estimation results 
 
 OLS        
Huber and Tukey  
Pi (6) 
 
Quantile 
regression Additive  models
† 
 
 
Pi  (7) Pi  (8) Pi  (9) Pi  (10) Pi  (11) Pi  (12) Pi  (13) 
MUF(%) 0.944*  
(0.511) 
1.384** 
(0.667) 
7.289 
4.711***  
IR: 0.25 
7.218 
5.775** 
IR:0.205 
1.254 
1.459 
IR:0.833 
7.278 
5.024*** 
IR: 0.55 
2.288 
9.228*** 
IR:0.089 
6.743 
3.502*** 
IR:0.667 
 
Environmental 
uncertainty 
-0.375*** 
(0.135) 
-0.475*** 
(0.176) 
3.005    
1.973     
DR: 6 
     
Decision 
rights 
0.160*** 
(0.0318) 
0.128** 
(0.0415) 
 1 
   4.285**  
D  DR:50        
            
    
System 
knowhow 
0.157***   
(0.0461) 
0.138** 
(0.0601) 
  4.331 
13.05***     
IR: 38 
   
Brand name 0.463*** 
(0.100) 
0.503*** 
(0.131) 
   6.445 
4.532***
IR: 20 
  
Trust 0.0986 
(0.114) 
0.0977 
(0.150) 
    7.695 
3.450***
IR: 9 
 
Behavioral 
uncertainty 
0.291* 
(0.166) 
0.329 
(0.217) 
     1.861 
2.296** 
IR: 8.23 
Constant 
 
10.36*** 
(3.235) 
 
11.67*** 
(4.224) 
 
0.0283068*** 
(0.0004603) 
 
35.5177*** 
(0.546) 
 
35.5177*** 
(0.4536) 
 
35.5177*** 
(0.4661) 
 
35.5177*** 
(0.4974) 
 
35.5177*** 
(0.5046) 
 N 166 166 166 166 166 166 
  
R2 , Pseudo R2 
 
21.58 23.6 22 37 33.5 24.2 22 
χ2 19.82***
 
       
AIC 
  1135.809 1103.513 1065.686 1082.259 1100.458 1103.931 
Freedom 
  11.29 9.22 6.58 14.72 10.98 9.6 
χ2 test for linearity 
  
7870.424*** 1260.819*** 1645.709*** 1689.136*** 1709.702*** 1083.395*** 
 
Note: * Signifiant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. † Smoothes terms. DR: Decreasing effect. IR: Increasing effect. 
 
  
(a)                                         (b) 
 
FIGURE 2. PARTIAL-REGRESSION FUNCTIONS FOR ADDITIVE NONPARAMETRIC MODELS (estimations 8 to 13). 
Gray area gives point-wise 95% conﬁdence envelopes around the ﬁt.
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Table 5 
Interactive structure 
 
  Additive models with interactive terms ±ⱡ 
  Pi (14) Pi (15) Pi (16) Pi (17) Pi (18) Pi (19) 
 
7,949 
3.473*** 
7,735 
5.621*** 
5,56 
1,254 
7,64 
2.467** 
2,21 
6.809*** 
5,397 
2.375**  MUF(%) 
              
Environmental  
uncertainty 
6,946 
3.005*** 
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Decision rights 
 
  1 
3.495* 
        
  
  
 
  
              
 System 
 
  5,328 
4.617*** 
  
 
  
 know-how 
 
    
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Brand name       5,827 
3.832*** 
    
  
 
  
  
  
              
Trust 
 
  
 
  7,737 
3.23** 
  
  
 
  
 
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
Behavioral  
uncertainty 
          1,609 
0,716 
 
     
  
 
Interaction MUF × 
contextual variable 
  
9,8 
4.843*** 
2,469 
3.524** 
8,601 
2.626*** 
4 
2.259* 
5,114 
5.204*** 
7,782 
2.499*** 
Constant 
34.7724*** 
(0.5081) 
35.5266*** 
(0.4949) 
34.7161*** 
(0.5022) 
35.0694*** 
(0.6147) 
35.2360*** 
(0.4736) 
34.9335*** 
(0.5188) 
  
              
N 166 166 166 166 166 166 
R2 44,5 26 47 36,5 36,9 30,1 
AIC 1061,467 1097,546 1049,615 1077,818 1074,612 1091,41 
Freedom 25,69 12,2 20,49 18,47 16,06 15,79 
 
            
 
Note: * Signifiant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
±The smooth term that produces a full tensor product smooth is presented here, which is more appropriate when 
the main effects are not present and the variables are not in the same measure unit. 
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ⱡ These smooth terms cannot be directly interpreted. 
 
The study of each perspective plot separately enables us to confront more precisely the 
hypotheses with the data. As we are dealing with non-linear relationships, the comments on 
the hypotheses cannot be summed up as "validated" or "non-validated" as they could be with 
parametric estimations. The relations between the variables are more complex in this case, as, 
for example, each hypothesis can be validated on a specific interval of the explanatory 
variable, but not on the other one. 
Regarding H1, the graphs (a) and (a') highlight that MUF increases performance between 
0 and 30% in the context of a strong brand name. This result suggests that in a context of a 
high-value brand name, the highest performance is reached with a 30% level of MUF. 
Hypothesis H2 finds empirical support, with the estimation results plotted in graphs (b), (b'). 
In a context of shirking, the higher the percentage of MUF in the network, the higher the 
performance. Broadly speaking, the interaction of behavioral uncertainty with MUF has a 
positive effect on the network performance. The estimations regarding H3 are plotted in 
graphs (c) and (c'). The key evidence from these three dimensional perspective plots is the 
existence of cycles in the impact of MUF on the performance, depending on environmental 
uncertainty. Thus, a first threshold of 8% can be distinguished, suggesting that, in a context of 
environmental uncertainty, an increase in MUF improves the performance, to the threshold of 
8% of MUF in the network. Relating to H4, the surfaces (d) and (d') address the system 
know-how context. The graphs are consistent with the estimation results presented in Table 4 
model (10). In this context, the level of MUF has no significant effect on the performance, 
whereas the level of system know-how does impact the performance. In fact, in all the models 
including the system know-how variable, the impact of the level of MUF is not significant. 
The graphs (e) and (e') relate to H5 and reveal that an increase of MUF improves the 
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performance in the network, regardless of the level of trust. Thresholds between the level of 
MUF and trust are highlighted, depending on the level of trust. Finally, graphs (f) and (f') 
regard hypothesis 6 and show that, in a context of delegation of decision rights, MUF 
increases the performance until 30%. The plots also reveal that a high level of decision rights 
increases the performance. 
  
  
(c) (d) 
 
 
(e) (f) 
 
FIGURE 2. PARTIAL-REGRESSION FUNCTIONS FOR ADDITIVE NONPARAMETRIC 
MODELS (estimations 8 to 13). Gray area gives point-wise 95% conﬁdence envelopes around 
the ﬁt.  
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                     (a)        Perspective plots related to H1       (a’)  
 
  
                     (b)        Perspective plots related to H2       (b’)  
 
               
 
 
 
                     (c)        Perspective plots related to H3       (c’)  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: PERSPECTIVE PLOTS OF THE FITTED ADDITIVE REGRESSION SURFACES  
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                     (d)        Perspective plots related to H4       (d’)  
 
 
 
                     (e)        Perspective plots related to H5       (e’)  
 
 
 
                     (f)        Perspective plots related to H6       (f’)  
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: PERSPECTIVE PLOTS OF THE FITTED ADDITIVE REGRESSION SURFACES  
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6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper deals with the impact of MUF on the network performance while controlling for 
selection and endogeneity bias related to the choice of an organizational form as explanatory 
variable. The key results can be summarized as follows: the use of MUF in the network 
significantly and positively impacts the performance. However, the results based on 
nonparametric models highlight thresholds from which the performance effect stabilizes (e.g., 
in the case of brand name and system knowhow as contextual variables, where the threshold is 
about 30% of MUF) and even cycles (taking into account the levels of trust, behavioral 
uncertainty, and delegation of decision rights). In addition, consistent with the hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical framework, we find evidence of interaction effects between MUF 
and each contextual variable, except for the variable system know-how. 
This study has important implications for both researchers and franchising practitioners.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that offers an empirical test of the major 
determinants of MUF network performance by applying  organizational economics theories 
(agency theory, transaction cost theory and property  rights theory) and the relational 
governance view. Overall, the  data provide  support of  our research model.  
Furthermore, the results of the study enable to develop new perspectives for future research. 
Specifically, the mix between multi-unit franchisees and single-unit franchisees in the 
network opens up new directions for future research. Both theoretical and additional empirical 
evidence would be required to explain the relationship between SUF and MUF within a 
franchising network. In addition, this study highlights the existence of cycles regarding the 
effect of an organizational form on performance. Further research is required to understand 
the turning points. Moreover, in addition to the mix between MUF and SUF in the network, 
the relationship between multi-unit franchising and proportion of company-owned outlets may 
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also influence franchise system performance. For instance, the franchisor’s decision rights are 
more diluted under MUF than under SUF because the franchisor transfers more decision 
management rights to the multi-unit franchisees. Under MUF, the franchisees have more 
decision making power regarding monitoring of local outlets, local human resource 
management and knowledge transfer between headquarters and local outlets. In this case, the 
franchisor may compensate the dilution of decision rights under MUF by an increase of 
control through more company-owned outlets.  As a result, future research has to investigate 
the relationship between MUF and the proportion of company-owned outlets and its impact 
on performance. 
In terms of managerial implications, the results show that the performance of franchise 
networks depends on the mix between MUF and SUF that is influenced by different 
contingency factors, such as uncertainty, brand name, trust, network age, size, and sector, or a 
combination of such variables. 
    Finally, two major limitations of the study have to be acknowledged. First, the data 
do not allow to differentiate between area development versus sequential MUF. Hence we 
could not examine the performance differences between both forms. Second, in this study, the 
performance measurement is based on subjective indicators. While objective measures have 
greater validity, most of the franchise systems in this survey do not disclose financial data. 
Although the literature has demonstrated that there is a strong positive correlation between 
objective and subjective performance indicators, future studies should test the model by using 
both subjective and objective performance indicators (Crook et al., 2008).
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